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Abstract
The majority of multinational rms today operate a multilateral production net-
work. Most existing empirical analyses have, however, focused on rmschoice be-
tween producing at home and investing overseas and assumed that a rms decision
to invest in a foreign country is independent of its locations in third countries. This
paper examines the e¤ect of existing production network on multinationalsentry
decision. Using detailed French multinational subsidiary level data, the paper nds
strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interdependence across multinationals
foreign production locations. There is, however, little evidence of horizontal in-
terdependence between home-country production and foreign investment when the
third-country e¤ects are taken into account, constituting a sharp contrast to the con-
ventional emphasis. This result is robust to the various specications and sensitivity
analyses undertaken in the paper, and highlights the importance of investigating
the causes and e¤ects of foreign direct investment in the context of multinational
production network.
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1 Introduction
The majority of multinational corporations (MNCs) today operate a multilateral production
network. An average French multinational, for example, invests in 3.8 foreign countries in 2007,
with an increase of 0.93 country per rm compared to 2005. The vast empirical literature of
multinational rms has, however, largely ignored the multilateral nature of MNC production and
primarily focused on the relationship between home-country production and foreign investment.
Most studies in the literature assume that a multinational rms decision to invest in a foreign
country is independent of its existing production network in third countries, an assumption that
is increasingly at odds as multinationals expand their production across foreign nations.
This paper addresses the above issue by examining the e¤ect of third-country production
network on multinationals entry decisions. To achieve the goal, the paper employs a rich
dataset that provides detailed information on French manufacturing rmsforeign subsidiaries
in 2005 and 2007. For each subsidiary, the data reports the location, ownership status, and
production activities. These information allows the paper to identify each individual rms
production network around the world and compare the structure of the network over time.
They also enable the paper to establish intra-rm linkage between subsidiaries, in particular,
the input-output relationship between subsidiariesproduction activities. This makes it possible
to distinguish the nature of interdependence between multinationalsforeign subsidiaries.
Figure 1, for example, plots the geographic distribution of Renaults global production net-
work. Two observations emerge in this gure. First, Renault owns subsidiaries in more than
10 countries outside of France. Second, Renault segments its production across its foreign
production locations by producing components in countries such as Argentina, South Korea,
and Spain (represented by the darker area) and performing end processes in countries such as
Russia and Colombia (represented by the lighter area). These phenomenons are not exclusive
to Renault, however. Figure 2 shows a similar pattern for another French multinational rm,
Essilor, which specializes in lens products. In fact, our data indicates that as of 2007 French
multinational rms have, on average, 0.72 upstream subsidiaries abroad (in which they produce
intermediate inputs required for nal-good production) and 2.49 downstream subsidiaries (in
which they produce the nal products). It is clear that multinationalsinvestment decision can
no longer be viewed as a choice between producing at home and investing abroad; it involves
instead a network of vertically linked subsidiaries.
[Figures 1-2 about here]
The econometric evidence suggests strong interdependence in multinationalsforeign produc-
tion network. Existing subsidiaries in third countries exert a signicant e¤ect on multinationals
expansion decision, in both downstream and upstream production. First, MNCs are more likely
to locate downstream production in countries where the cost of importing nal goods from the
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rmsexisting foreign subsidiaries is relatively high. We refer to this e¤ect as horizontal inter-
dependence. Second, multinationals tend to produce the nal product in countries with better
access to large export markets where the MNCs do not have downstream production. We label
this e¤ect as the market potential factor. Third, there is a signicant interaction between up-
stream and downstream subsidiaries. Specically, multinationals tend to locate the nal-good
production in countries where the cost of importing intermediate inputs from the rmsexisting
foreign upstream subsidiaries is relatively low. Similarly, they are more likely to select coun-
tries with better market access to the existing downstream subsidiaries as intermediate-input
production locations. We refer to this type of interaction as vertical interdependence and show
that it is not uniform across vertically linked subsidiaries. The interdependence increases in
the extent of input-output linkage between subsidiaries as well as the size of market demand in
downstream production locations.
In sharp contrast to the strong interaction between MNCsforeign production locations, there
is little evidence of horizontal interdependence between multinationalsproduction at home and
new investment abroad. We nd in the paper that evidence that would support the traditional
argument  on the tradeo¤ between foreign investment and home-country production  be-
comes insignicant once we take into account the third-country network factors. Instead, we
observe a vertical interdependence. These results are robust to the various specications and
sensitivity analyses undertaken to address the bias of omitted variables and the potential endo-
geneity of network factors. This deviation from the literature suggests that assuming away the
interdependence between foreign production locations is likely to give rise to biased estimates
on the relationship between home-economy performance and FDI activities and, more generally,
biased understanding of the true causes and e¤ects of FDI. It calls for a reconsideration of
the conventional specication to take into account the e¤ect of third-country network. The
ndings also convey an important message to host-country policy makers that seek to inuence
the inow of foreign investment: FDI inow to third countries can a¤ect a countrys ability to
attract multinationals. The e¤ect can be either positive or negative dependent on the linkage
of FDI ows.
This paper is closely related to a growing theoretical literature, led by Yeaple (2003a),
Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007), and Bergstrand and Egger (2008), that applies FDI
modeling to a three-country framework. These studies build on the seminal work of Markusen
(1984) and Helpman (1984) and inuential empirical contributions by Brainard (1997), Carr,
Markusen and Maskus (2001), Yeaple (2003b), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), and Hanson,
Mataloni and Slaughter (2005), who point out the two main motives for multinationals to
invest abroad are market access and comparative advantage.1 Yeaple (2003a), Ekholm, Forslid
and Markusen (2007), and Bergstrand and Egger (2008) show that the combination of the
market-access and comparative-advantage motives can lead to export-platform FDI, where a
1See Blonigen (2005) for an excellent survey of this literature.
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multinational rm invests in a host country with the intention to serve third nations via exports
from the host country. This prediction suggests that multinationalsinvestment decision cannot
be viewed as a binary choice between exporting from home and investing abroad; it engages
other, third nations.
The majority of the empirical literature has, however, not taken into account the third-
country e¤ect, much less the interdependence between multinationalsforeign production loca-
tions. The following few studies took the step to examine the determinants of export-platform
FDI. Head and Mayer (2004) show that third-country market demand plays a signicant role in
a countrys ability to attract multinational rms. They nd that Japanese multinationals are
more likely to locate their production in regions proximate to large markets. Baltagi, Egger and
Pfa¤ermayr (2007) consider a broader set of third-country characteristics, and nd that most
of the characteristics exert a signicant e¤ect on the level of U.S. outbound FDI even though
there is no conclusive evidence on export-platform or vertical FDI. Chen (2009) examines how
a host countrys preferential trade agreement with third nations can a¤ect the countrys receipt
of FDI and nds that countries integrated with large markets tend to experience an increase in
total and export-platform investment. She also shows that the e¤ect is especially strong for
labor-abundant countries, but at the expense of the labor-scarce preferential trading partners.
Blonigen, Davies and et al. (2007) is among the rst to investigate cross-country interdepen-
dence in FDI. Using U.S. outbound FDI data, they examine how investments in third countries
a¤ect a countrys receipt of FDI from the U.S. They nd that the results are sensitive to the
sample of host countries examined: the third-country e¤ect can be either insignicant or of
reverse signs. There is some evidence of negative interdependence across proximate host coun-
tries  a result that is consistent with the export-platform FDI theory  but mainly among
European OECD members. They also nd that including third-country FDI does not alter the
estimated e¤ect of traditional FDI determinants.
This paper examines the cross-country interdependence in individual multinationalspro-
duction networks using subsidiary-level data. The dataset employed here o¤ers two distinct
advantages relative to the aggregate data used in the literature. First, it allows us to distin-
guish horizontal and vertical linkage for each pair of subsidiaries at disaggregate industry level
(NACE 4-digit), following the methodology introduced in Alfaro and Charlton (forthcoming).
This distinction cannot be done at the aggregate industry level that has been considered in
previous studies (e.g., "industrial machinery and equipment") because as Alfaro and Charlton
(forthcoming) point out a large percentage of vertical FDI is intra-industry. This, to some
extent, can explain the ambiguous evidence in Blonigen, Davies and et al. (2007) where esti-
mates can reect a mix of horizontal and vertical interaction. Second, we examine individual
multinational rmsentry decision. In contrast to aggregate sectoral FDI data that combines
all individual rms, this allows us to compare the e¤ect of traditional FDI determinants with
the e¤ect of third-country network at rm level. We nd that the ability to focus on intra-
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rm interdependence leads to sharply di¤erent ndings than previous studies: the estimated
horizontal interdependence between FDI and home-country exports disappears once we include
third-country network variables. This departure from previous ndings is not surprising given
the data used there is not equivalent to an individual rms investment decision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we examine the geographic
attributes of French MNC production networks. In Section 3, we use a simple three-country
theoretical framework to provide a motivation for the empirical analysis. We then describe
the econometric methodology in Section 4 and data sources in Section 5. We present the
main econometric results in Section 6 and several sensitivity analyses in Section 7. The paper
concludes in Section 8.
2 Attributes of French MNC production networks
We employ a dataset of French manufacturing MNCs for our empirical analysis. In this section,
we rst take a look at the attributes of French MNC production networks. Figures 3 plots
the distribution of French multinational rms in 2005 and 2007 by the number of countries in
which investments occur. The majority of French MNCs concentrate their foreign production
activities in 3 or more countries in 2007 while some spread to as many as 63. Comparing 2007
with 2005, there is a signicant expansion in the size of network with an average increase of 0.93
per rm. A large fraction of foreign production locations comprises downstream subsidiaries,
i.e., subsidiaries that engage in nal-good production.2 The average number of countries in
which rms own downstream subsidiaries is 2.49, signicantly greater than the average number
of countries in which rms have upstream production locations.
[Figure 3 about here]
Now we examine the geographic density of each production network. In Figure 4, we plot
the level of distance between each pair of subsidiaries owned by the same French MNCs. As
shown in the graph, the closest two subsidiaries are 66 kilometers apart (located in Austria
and Slovakia) and the furthest pair is 19,845 kilometers apart (in Estonia and New Zealand).
The majority of subsidiaries are within 6,126 kilometers, while the average distance is about
6,000. The graph also indicates that a large percentage of French MNC subsidiaries are either
clustered in neighboring countries (such as EU members) or located relatively distant from each
other. This is further conrmed at the multinational rm level where we calculate the average
subsidiary distance for each French MNC: While a signicant fraction of French multinationals
have a dispersed subsidiary network, many of them concentrate their subsidiaries geographically.
We then compare the distance between downstream production locations (owned by the same
French MNCs) with the distance between vertically linked subsidiaries. As shown in Figure 5,
2We describe in detail how we identify downstream and upstream subsidiaries in Section 4.
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the former tends to be greater than the latter as expected. Multinationals tend to duplicate
their nal-product production in countries that are geographically distant from each other. But
they build their upstream and downstream subsidiaries in proximate locations.
[Figures 4-5 about here]
The above observations similarly apply to tari¤s. In Figure 6, we plot the level of tari¤
between each pair of subsidiaries on the subsidiariesprimary good. It is shown that more than
30 percent of subsidiary pairs do not have tari¤ between each other and more than 50 percent
have 7% or lower tari¤ rates. This is also conrmed at the parent rm level: More than 15
percent of French MNCs locate their subsidiaries in countries where tari¤s have been removed
for each other and 50 percent face an average of 6% or lower tari¤ when exporting from one
subsidiary to another. This suggests that French MNCs are not always driven by the tari¤-
jumping motive when they choose their foreign production locations; a large percentage of them
invest in countries where they can export to without paying tari¤. This becomes more clear
when we compare in Figure 7 the tari¤ between downstream production locations (on rmsnal
good) and the tari¤ of importing intermediate inputs from upstream locations. The former is
signicantly higher than the latter, suggesting tari¤s motivate rms to expand their production
horizontally but discourage them from building vertical production network.
[Figures 6-7 about here]
3 Theoretical motivation
As a prelude to the empirical analysis, we consider a stylized theoretical framework in this
section and provide a motivation for the empirical hypotheses.
3.1 General setup
Suppose the world consists of N countries N = f1; 2; :::; Ng. The representative consumer in
each country allocates a certain amount of her expenditure, denoted as Ij (j 2 N ), to the
industry of di¤erentiated products. Within this industry, the consumer has a utility function
with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Maximizing the CES utility function subject to
the consumers expenditure level yields the consumer demand function for each representative
variety qij = Yjp ij ; where qij is the quantity of the di¤erentiated product produced by rms in
country i and sold to destination country j, Yj  Ij=
P
r p
1 
rj is the demand level in country j
with r representing the set of varieties, pij the price of this product, and  the constant elasticity
of substitution. Note that pij = ij pi, where pi is country is product market price and ij > 1
is the iceberg trade cost of exporting from country i to country j (with ii = 1).
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Each rm produces a di¤erent brand of the di¤erentiated product. Given the interest of
this paper, we assume that country 1s rms can produce their nal good in any of the other
countries while the other countriesrms produce only at home and serve the foreign markets
via exports. Firms must pay a plant-level xed cost F for each nal-good production location.
They must also produce one unit of intermediate input for each unit of nal product.3 Like
the nal product, country 1s rms can produce the intermediate input in any of the countries.
For simplicity, we assume that the plant-level xed cost for intermediate-input production, G,
is su¢ ciently large such that rms would build their upstream production in only one location.4
We also assume that the upstream subsidiary will sell the inputs to the downstream subsidiaries
at mkki, where mk is the marginal cost of producing the intermediate input and ki is the cost
of exporting the intermediate input from country k to country i.
Now let di be an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the rm locates the downstream
production in country i and similarly ui be an indicator variable that identies the existence
of upstream production location. We can then characterize each rms production network
as g  fdi; uig, where i 2 N . Based on the observed production network, we dene a rm
as a national rm if there is no subsidiary abroad, and a multinational if there is at least one
foreign subsidiary. We also let Nd(g) = fi 2 N : di = 1g denote the set of countries in which
the rm has downstream production and Nu(g) = fi 2 N : ui = 1g the set in which the rm
has upstream production. We use nd(g) and nu(g) to represent the cardinality of the two sets
respectively.
In the rest of this section, we examine rmsdecision to undertake horizontal and vertical
investments in a given production network. First, we note at prot maximization each rm will
set the price at
pi =
(ci +mkki)
(   1) ; (1)
where ci is the marginal cost of producing the nal good in country i. This implies that the
operating prot the rm will earn by producing the intermediate input in country k and nal
good in country i and selling to destination country j, i.e., g = fdi = 1; uk = 1g, is
ij(g) =
1


1
ci +mkki
 1
ij
 Yj : (2)
It is clear that ij is an increasing function of country js demand (i.e., Yj) and a decreasing
3Given this papers focus on intra-rm linkages, we do not consider here the option of purchasing intermediate
inputs from una¢ liated suppliers. The latter possibility and its role in rmslocation decision is an interesting
reseach question in its own right and has a large scope for future empirical research. For seminal theoretical
studies in this area, see, for example, Krugman and Venables (1996), Venables (1996), and Puga and Venables
(1997). The empirical analysis of this paper attempts to control for these factors using host-country and rm
xed e¤ects as rm-level data that identies intermediate-input suppliers is largely missing.
4While this assumption is roughly in alignment with the data which shows French multinationals have, on
average, 0.72 upstream subsidiaries abroad and 2.49 downstream subsidiaries, it is not crucial for the comparative
analysis the model seeks to conduct.
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function of the nal good marginal cost (i.e., ci) and the trade cost to ship the nal good from
country i to country j (i.e., ij). Furthermore, because production consists of two stages, ij
also decreases in the marginal cost of producing the intermediate input (i.e., mk) as well as the
trade cost of shipping the input to the nal good production location (i.e., ki).
Now suppose the rm has chosen Nd(g) as the set of locations to produce the nal good
and country k as the location to produce intermediate inputs, i.e., Nu(g) = k. The total prot
function will then be
(g) =
X
i2Nd(g)
1


1
ci +mkki
 1
Yi (3)
+
X
j2NnNd(g)
max
i2Nd(g)
"
1


1
ci +mkki
 1
ij
 Yj
#
  nd(g)F  G:
In this equation, the rst term represents the operating prot from domestic sales (in countries
with has downstream production), the second term represents the operating prot from export
sales (in markets without downstream production), and the last two the xed costs of down-
stream and upstream production (which increases as rms expand the number of production
locations). Note that the export prot depends on the choice of export-platform countries,
i.e., the downstream production locations in Nd(g) from which the rm exports to the other
markets. Firms will strictly prefer location conguration g to g if and only if
(g) > (g) : (4)
3.2 Downstream location decision
Given our goal to examine rmsinvestment decision in a given production network, suppose
the current production network comprises a downstream plant in country ei and an upstream
plant in country ek, i.e., g0 = fdei = 1; uek = 1g. We rst look at the decision to build a new
downstream production subsidiary in country i, i.e., di. If di = 1, the production network
will move from g0 to g1 = fdi = dei = 1; uek = 1g.
Firms will build a downstream subsidiary in i if and only if
(g1) > (g0) : (5)
Given equation (3), we can simplify the above condition to
(ci +mekeki)1 Mi > ei(eii Yi +M eei ) + F; (6)
whereMi  Yi+M ei = Yi+
P
j2NnNd(g1)(ij
 Yj) represents country is market potential, which
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includes country is domestic market size Yi and the size of export markets M ei in which the
rm does not have downstream production, and ei  (cei+mekekei)1 .5 Let eki  mek=ci denote
the extent of vertical linkage between intermediate input and nal good; the above expression
can be re-written as:
c1 i (1 + ekieki)1 Mi > ei(eii Yi +M eei ) + F: (7)
As monotonic transformations and terms such as ei and M eei do not a¤ect the ordering of
host countries (i), we simplify condition (7) (and take natural logs on both sides) to obtain a
simple and intuitive empirical specication:
Pr [di = 1jg0] = (8)
[d1 ln ci + d2 lnYi + 
u
d ln(1 + ekieki)| {z }
vertical
+md lnMi| {z }
market potential
+dd lneii| {z }
horizontal
+ "]:
In this specication, Pr [di = 1jg0] represents each rms probability to build a new down-
stream production location in country i given its existing production network g0 and [:] is the
cumulative probability function. The terms ln(1 + ekieki) and lneii represent the trade costs
to import from the rms existing upstream and downstream production locations respectively,
capturing the vertical and horizontal interdependence in the network. The variable lnMi repre-
sents country is market potential given rms downstream production network. The residual "
captures all the remaining factors including ei and M eei , which comprise attributes of the rms
existing production location and are invariant with country is attributes. We control for these
factors with rm dummies in the empirical analysis.
We expect, based on the model, that the e¤ect of host-country variables satises d1 < 0 and
d2 > 0. The e¤ect of existing production network varies with the nature of the subsidiaries.
We expect the e¤ect of vertically linked subsidiaries to satisfy ud < 0, i.e., rms have a greater
incentive to build downstream subsidiaries where the cost of importing intermediate inputs is
low, especially when the vertical linkage between upstream and downstream production, i.e.,
eki, is large. The expected e¤ect of existing downstream network is dd > 0, i.e., rms are more
likely to expand horizontally when the trade cost of importing nal goods is relatively high.
The host-country market potential is predicted to have a positive e¤ect, implying md > 0.
5The above condition assumes that rm will choose the new downstream subsidiary as the export platform to
serve countries in which it does not have downstream production. In reality rm can choose between all existing
subsidiaries when deciding how to serve each market. However, since the supply strategy information is rarely
observable at rm-market level, we take into account all potential export markets when measuring each countrys
market potential.
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3.3 Upstream location decision
Now consider rms upstream location decision. Given network g0 (where dei = 1; uek = 1), rm
will build a new upstream production subsidiary in country k and move to network g2 = fdei =
1; uk = 1g if and only if
(g2) > (g0) : (9)
Given equation (3), this is equivalent to

(cei +mkkei)1    (cei +mekekei)1 Mei > 0: (10)
It can be further transformed to
m1 k

1
kei + kei
1 
> ei; (11)
where kei  mk=cei and ei  (cei +mekekei)1 .
Based on the above condition, we obtain the following simplied specication to examine
rmsdecision to build upstream subsidiaries:
Pr [uk = 1jg0] = [u lnmk + du lnkei| {z }
vertical
+ "]: (12)
In this expression, Pr [uk = 1jg0] denotes rms probability to build a new upstream production
location in country k given its existing production network g0. We expect that u < 0 and
du < 0 (i.e., rms have greater incentives to produce the intermediate input in countries with
relatively better access to the rmsexisting downstream production locations, i.e., low kei).
4 Econometric framework
We now describe the econometric framework adopted in the empirical analysis. Following equa-
tions (8) and (12), we consider the following specications:
downstream : Pr [dt = 1] = Xt 1d (13)
+dd W dd;t 1  dt 1 + ud W ud;t 1  ut 1 + md  lnMt 1 + d;t
uptream : Pr [ut = 1] = Xt 1u + 
d
u W du;t 1  dt 1 + u;t: (14)
In the above equations, dt and ut are two vectors of observations of the two binary dependent
variables which represent, respectively, each rms decision to build downstream and upstream
subsidiary in a given country, Xt 1 is a matrix of observations of lagged exogenous variables,
and d and u are vectors of parameters. The model includes a number of network variables
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including (i) W dd;t 1  dt 1 (horizontal interdependence) where dt 1  fdit 1(a)g represents each
rms downstream production locations in the lagged period, (ii) W ud;t 1  ut 1 and W du;t 1  dt 1
(vertical interdependence), where ut 1  fuit 1(a)g represents each rms upstream production
locations in the lagged period, and (iii) Mt 1 Wmd;t 1  (1  dt 1) (market potential). Our goal
is to estimate dd, 
u
d , 
m
d and 
d
u along with d and u.
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We now dene the four weighting matrices, W dd;t 1, W
u
d;t 1, W
m
d;t 1 and W
d
u;t 1, used in the
model. First, consider four N  N matrices !dd;t 1(a), !ud;t 1(a), !md;t 1(a), and !du;t 1(a) for
each rm in the sample (where a denotes the rm and N the number of countries).
The cells in !dd;t 1(a) are dened based on equation (8) and given by
!dd;ijt 1(a) = lnjit 1(a); (15)
where i; j = 1; :::; N and jit 1(a) > 1 is the trade cost rm a incurs when importing the nal
good from country j to country i. If rm a indeed produces the nal product in country j, the
higher this cost, the more incentive rm a has to invest in country i.
Similarly, the cells in !ud;t 1(a) are given by
!ud;ijt 1(a) = ln

1 + j(a)  jit 1(a)

; (16)
where j(a) is the input-output coe¢ cient between the good produced by rm a in country j
and its nal good and jit 1(a) is the trade cost for rm a to import the good produced in
country j to country i. If rm a indeed produces in country j and the good produced serves as
an intermediate input for as nal good (i.e., j(a) > 0), a greater trade cost to import from j
would lower rm as incentive to locate downstream production in country i.
Next, following Section 3.2, we dene Mi 
P
j(1  dj)Yj=ij and the cells in !md;t 1(a) as
!md;ijt 1(a) = Yjt 1=ijt 1(a); (17)
where Yjt 1 is the market demand in country j and ijt 1(a) is the trade cost rm a would
incur when exporting the nal good from country i to country j. Each cell in !md;t 1(a) thus
captures country is export market potential in country j.
Finally, the cells in !du;t 1(a) are dened based on equation (12):
!du;ijt 1(a) = lnijt 1(a); (18)
6We do not consider in this paper the potential contemporaneous correlation between entries for two reasons.
First, the data includes all the entries observed between 2005 and 2007 but does not record the exact time of
entry. To establish the causal e¤ect of production network, we consider only the locations that existed in 2005
when we construct the third-country network variables. Second, the data shows that only a small number of
multinational rms make more than one entry between 2005 and 2007. The results were largely similar when we
excluded these rms from the sample.
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where ijt 1(a) is the trade cost for rm a to export intermediate inputs from country i to
country j. If a has a downstream production location in j, this trade cost is negatively correlated
with as incentive to produce the intermediate input in i.
Given !dd;t 1(a), !
u
d;t 1(a), !
m
d;t 1(a) and !
d
u;t 1(a), we can construct the aggregate weighting
matrices, W dd;t 1, W
u
d;t 1, W
m
d;t 1 and W
d
u;t 1. These aggregate matrices consist of !dd;t 1(a),
!ud;t 1(a), !
m
d;t 1(a) and !
d
u;t 1(a) respectively along the diagonal and 0 everywhere else. For
example, W dd;t 1 is an NK NK matrix given by
W dd;t 1 =
26666664
!dd;t 1(a1)
nd;t 1(a1)
0 0 0
0
!dd;t 1(a2)
nd;t 1(a2)
0 0
0 0
. . . 0
0 0 0
!dd:t 1(aK)
nd;t 1(aK)
37777775 (19)
where a1; a2; :::; aK represent the set of rms in the sample (with K = 1698) and N represents
the number of host countries and equals to 99. Note we scale !dd;t 1(a), !
u
d;t 1(a) and !
d
u;t 1(a)
with the rms (downstream and upstream) production network size, i.e., nd;t 1(a1), nu;t 1(a1)
and nd;t 1(a1) respectively. The purpose of doing this is to estimate average interdependence
across subsidiaries.
Finally, we include a rm xed e¤ect throughout the empirical analysis to control for all rm-
specic factors such as factor intensities and the aggregate attributes of existing subsidiaries.7
The use of rm dummies allows us to focus exclusively on the cross-country interaction within
each multinationals production network.
5 Data
The dataset employed in this paper is obtained from BvDEP AMADEUS, a comprehensive
database that contains the nancial and subsidiary information of public and private European
rms. AMADEUS is collected by information providers at each national o¢ cial public body
(e.g., Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle (National Institute for Industrial Property)
in the case of France) and has a particularly good coverage for countries including France, which
partly motivated the use of French rms for this analysis.
The dataset reports French multinationalssubsidiary activities in 99 host countries in 2005
and 2007.8 It is compiled from two editions of AMADEUS that were published in 2006 and
7To avoid the incidental parameter problem that would arise with xed-e¤ect Maximum Likelihood Estimators,
we adopt linear-probability model in Section 6. We also considered excluding rm xed e¤ect and using probit
and logit models while controlling for rm characteristics such as capital intensity and productivity. The main
results remain largely similar and are available upon request. We did not adopt conditional logit model because
it would drop all multinational rms that did not incur any entry from the empirical analysis.
8The nal sample is smaller in some specications because of the missing values in explanatory variables.
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2008 respectively.9 For each multinational rm, the data lists not only the subsidiary locations
but also the primary product, sales, assets and employment of each location.10 There are in
total 1,698 French multinational rms in the dataset. These rms invest in on average 2.88 host
countries in 2005 and 3.81 countries in 2007. The average increase in the number of invested
countries is 0.93.11
As discussed in Section 3, we distinguish two types of subsidiaries. To do so, we follow the
methodology introduced in Alfaro and Charlton (forthcoming). First, we identify subsidiaries
that engage in nal-good production. To do so, we compare each subsidiarys primary prod-
uct with the parent rms primary and secondary products, all of which are reported at NACE
4-digit level.12 If the subsidiarys primary product is listed as one of the parent rms nal prod-
ucts, it is considered as a downstream production location. We also identify subsidiaries that
engage in upstream production. This is determined by examining the input-output relationship
between the subsidiarys primary product and the parent rms nal products. A subsidiary
is considered as an upstream production location if the direct requirement of the subsidiarys
primary product in the parent rms nal-product production exceeds a threshold value.13 This
direct identication of downstream and upstream subsidiaries has been generally absent in the
literature, with the exception of Alfaro and Charlton (forthcoming), mainly because of the lack
of information on subsidiary-level activities.
According to our denition, we nd the average number of countries in which French multi-
nationals have downstream subsidiaries is 2.49 whereas the number of countries with upstream
subsidiaries is around 0.72.14 More than 75 percent of newly established subsidiaries between
2005 and 2007 are downstream production locations, suggesting that rms are more inclined to
expand horizontally than vertically.
Following Section 4, we use three subsidiary-level variables to construct the various weighting
matrices needed to dene existing network characteristics. These variables include (i) the
distance between each pair of host countries (as a proxy for transport cost), (ii) the tari¤ rates
between each pair of host countries on parent rms nal products and intermediate inputs
produced overseas, and (iii) the input-output coe¢ cient between the parent rms nal products
and the subsidiarys primary good. We obtain the distance data from the CEPII distance
9AMADEUS does not directly report time series on subsidiary data. To obtain that information, one needs
to acquire di¤erent editions of AMADEUS that were published in di¤erent years.
10The coverage of sales, assets and employment data is not as complete as the location information.
11 It is worth noting that there are very few exits (i.e., subsidiary shut-downs) in the dataset. Nearly all the
subsidiaries that existed in 2005 are active in 2007.
12AMADEUS reports both primary and secondary products for parent rms. We take into account both in
our denition of downstream and upstream subsidiaries.
13The paper has considered di¤erent threshold values and found the results relatively similar. The results
presented in the following sections are obtained based on the threshold value 0.1. We also weigh each upstream
subsidiary with its input-output coe¢ cient.
14Less than 20 percent of subsidiaries belong to neither cateogries and engage in activities such as wholesale
distribution services. They are hence not included in the construction of downstream and upstream network
variables.
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database and tari¤ data from the WITS. The tari¤ data are applied tari¤ rates measured at
NACE 4-digit level and reect preferential tari¤ rates between host countries. We use the
input-output table from the 2002 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) benchmark survey.
This I-O table is more disaggregated than the alternatives including the I-O table from the
INSEE (and other available national sources).
In addition to the rm network variables, we take into account FDI determinants that have
traditionally been emphasized in the literature. First, we include several conventional variables
used to capture the trade cost between home and host countries. Existing studies point out
that multinationals have a greater incentive to invest in countries that require larger trade costs
to export the nal goods from home. To examine the importance of this motive, we include the
distance between a potential host and France and tari¤ rates set by host countries on France in
each multinational rms primary nal product category.15 The hypothesis predicts a positive
parameter on both variables: the higher the transport cost and host-country tari¤ for rms to
export the products from home, the more likely the rm will produce the product inside the host
country. In addition to the above market access variables, we also include host-country domestic
market size, measured by real GDP. Multinationals that are attracted by the host-country local
market size are expected to have a greater probability of investing in larger countries.
We also control for multinationalscomparative advantage motive. Specically, we take into
account host countriesmarginal cost of production by including each host countrys real unit
labor cost. This data is aggregated from the industry level where each industry is weighed by
its output share. The labor cost and output data are available from the World Bank Trade and
Production Database. Furthermore, we include the tari¤ rate France sets on the host-country
exports. The expectation is that multinationals seeking to export their products back to France
would be adversely a¤ected by this tari¤.
Finally, we take into account various measures of investment costs. First, we control for
host countriestax policy using the maximum corporate tax rate, available from the U.S. O¢ ce
of Tax Policy Research.16 Second, we include the costs of starting a business, available from the
World Development Indicators, as a proxy for entry cost. Third, we use the distance between
France and the host country as a proxy for xed cost of investment, with the expectation that
subsidiaries located in remote markets are likely to require a larger xed cost such as the cost
of monitoring. Note all the explanatory variables are measured with the 2005 data. Table A.1
describes the source and summary statistics of the variables.17
15We also used the average tari¤ rate imposed on the rms primary and secondary products. The results were
qualitatively similar.
16 Ideally, we would like to use the applied corporate tax rate in each host country. But this data consists of a
large number of missing values for the countries in our sample.
17 In the empirical analysis, we also consider using a country xed e¤ect to control for omitted host-country
characteristics such as political stability and existing stock of multinationals.
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6 Empirical evidence
We now turn to the econometric analysis and examine the e¤ect of existing production networks
on multinationalsentry decision. We proceed by rst estimating equations (13) and (14) with
only conventional explanatory variables, i.e., excluding the e¤ect of third-country locations and
assuming dd = 0, 
u
d = 0, 
m
d = 0, and 
d
u = 0.
Excluding network e¤ects
The results are reported in Table 1. We nd the e¤ect of included explanatory variables
is largely consistent with the existing literature when no third-country factors are taken into
account.18 First, rms exhibit a signicant market-access motive that is in alignment with the
literature. They are more likely to build nal-good production in countries with a larger GDP.
They also have a greater incentive to enter countries that set a higher tari¤ on the imports of
their nal products from France. The parameter of EU membership is also consistent. Firms
are more likely to choose FDI instead of export in countries outside the EU. The e¤ect of
distance is negative, a nding that has been shown in previous studies and explained by the role
of distance in raising the xed cost of investment.
The evidence also indicates a signicant comparative advantage motive. Countries with a
lower unit labor cost attract more multinationals to build downstream production. Investment
costs also exert a signicant e¤ect on multinationalsentry decision. A larger cost of starting
business is associated with a lower probability of attracting multinational rms. The sign of
the corporate tax parameter is inconsistent with expectation, however. This can be a result
of the tax measure included in the paper. The corporate tax data used here reports each host
countrys maximum corporate tax rate and does not necessarily capture the rate applied to
multinational rms. The latter information is not systematically available and would reduce
the sample size substantially.
[Table 1 about here]
In the fourth column of Table 1, we include a host-country xed e¤ect to control for all
unobserved host-country characteristics. We nd the e¤ect of host-country tari¤ set on France
remains signicant and positive. This suggests controlling for country-level attributes does not
change the estimated e¤ect of the conventional market access variable. The parameter of home-
country tari¤ also becomes signicant: A higher tari¤ to export the nal product back to France
lowers multinationalsincentive to produce the good abroad. This result is consistent with the
comparative advantage motive hypothesis: Some French multinationals serve their home country
from foreign production location and are adversely a¤ected by home-country tari¤.
18The H0 column in Table 1 (and the following tables) summarizes the hypotheses on the e¤ect of explanatory
variables that are predicted by either the model or the literature.
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Next we examine multinationalsupstream location decision. As shown in the last columns
of Table 1, the results are largely similar. Countries with a larger GDP and a higher tari¤ have
a greater probability to attract multinationals. Those that are relatively remote from France
and have a higher real unit labor cost or a higher entry cost are less likely to become upstream
production locations. A result that is not expected analytically is the positive e¤ect of French
tari¤. A higher tari¤ to export the nal product back to France motivates French rms to move
upstream production overseas. Again, controlling for unobserved host-country attributes with
host-country dummies does not change the estimated e¤ect of host- and home-country tari¤s
on each other.
Including network e¤ects
Now let us take into account the potential e¤ect of foreign production network. Table
2 reports the estimates obtained for the downstream equation in (13). The table indicates
strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interdependence in multinationalsforeign production
network. First, multinationals are signicantly more likely to build downstream production
in countries that are relatively distant from the rmsexisting downstream locations. A 100-
percent increase in third-country distance raises the probability of entry by 0.6 percentage point
or equivalently 60 percent.19 This result similarly applies to tari¤. The incentive to enter a host
country rises in the tari¤ of importing nal good from the existing locations. Export-market
potential also plays a signicant role. Multinationals have a greater probability to produce the
nal product in countries with a large export potential. This points out the signicance of
export-platform FDI, in which multinationals use host countries as the platform to supply third
countries  in particular, the third countries where multinationals do not have downstream
production activities present. These ndings remain robust after we include host-country xed
e¤ect and control for all host-country specic attributes.
[Table 2 about here]
The e¤ect of the conventional market access variables is a¤ected, however, by the consider-
ation of downstream production network. As seen in Table 2, the parameter of host-country
tari¤ on France becomes statistically insignicant when the third-country variables are taken
into account. This constitutes sharp contrast with Table 1, where the evidence suggests a
horizontal interdependence between foreign production and home-country exports: Market ac-
cess from home has a signicant e¤ect on multinationalslocation choice. This change in the
results suggests that it is not adequate to focus exclusively on the home-host interdependence.
As multinationalsproduction network expands over time, there is increasing interdependence
across foreign production locations. The choice of where to invest is no longer conditional
19The average tted probability of downstream entry is 0.01.
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on the tradeo¤ between FDI and exporting from home alone; it has become a more complex
decision involving third countries. Ignoring the third-country network e¤ect is likely to give
rise to biased estimates on the relationship between the performance of the home economy and
FDI activities and, more generally, biased understanding of the true causes and e¤ects of FDI.
In column (2) of Table 2, we take into account the e¤ect of existing upstream production
network. The results there show that the role of trade cost is reversed when there is a vertical
linkage between foreign production locations. Multinationals are motivated to cluster vertically
linked subsidiaries in proximate countries. For example, countries that are 100-percent farther
to the multinationalsexisting upstream locations have a 0.1-percentage-point (equivalently 10
percent) lower probability to attract multinationals. This result suggests that upstream FDI
in neighboring countries can trigger an increase in downstream FDI.
The e¤ect of upstream production network also increases in the extent of vertical linkage,
as shown in Table 3. Here, we interact the trade cost of importing intermediate inputs with
the input-output coe¢ cient with respect to the multinationalsnal product. The parameters
indicate that the incentive to cluster production stages is especially large when there is a strong
vertical linkage. These results, again, are not sensitive to the use of host-country dummies.
[Table 3 about here]
Now we proceed to examine multinationalsupstream entry decision. As shown in Table
4, we nd, again, signicant evidence of vertical interdependence. Multinationals tend to
build upstream production locations in countries that are relatively proximate to the existing
downstream locations. This is especially true when the downstream country has a relatively
large market potential. These results reect rms incentive to reduce intra-rm trade costs
and build a geographically concentrated network of vertically linked subsidiaries.
[Table 4 about here]
7 Sensitivity analysis
7.1 Alternative weighting matrices
So far we have used distance and tari¤ to capture the extent of trade cost. While these two
variables possibly represent the most prominent forms of trade barriers, they do not capture
all the trade costs faced by multinationals. We hence consider in this section an alternative
measure in the construction of weighting matrices. Specically, we use disaggregate trade ows
as a proxy for host countriesopenness toward one another.
For example, when estimating rm as downstream entry decision in country i given its
existing downstream production location in ei, we use the import value of country i from countryei in rm as primary nal product (in NACE 4-digit level) as the proxy for country is openness
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to country ei. Countries that are relatively open to the multinationals existing downstream
locations are less likely to be selected as new hosts. We also obtain country is import from
country ek where rm a has an upstream subsidiary (in the category of the subsidiarys primary
good). The hypothesis here is that multinationals are more likely to produce the nal product in
countries that are relatively more accessible from the rmsexisting upstream locations. Finally,
we use country is exports to all the third countries where rm a does not have downstream
production (in as primary nal product) to construct is export market potential. To avoid
endogeneity, we use trade data in 2005 which is available from COMTRADE.20
Table 5 reports the results obtained with trade-weighted network variables. The evidence
indicates signicant and consistent horizontal and vertical interdependence across multination-
als foreign subsidiaries. Multinationals have a particularly strong incentive to expand their
downstream production in countries that import relatively less from their existing third-country
downstream locations. They are also motivated to choose countries where there are large trade
inows from the rmsexisting upstream subsidiaries.
[Table 5 about here]
When examining multinationalsupstream entry decision, we take into account each host
countrys market access to the rms existing downstream locations. Specically, for each
multinational rm a and and host country i, we obtain is average export value to all the third
countries where rm a engages in nal-stage production. Ideally, we would like to use the export
of the subsidiarys primary good, but this information is only observable for countries that have
been selected as production locations. The counterfactual information is not available for those
that were not chosen. As a result, we use each host countrys average export in manufacturing
industries to construct the countrys market access. The results are reported in the last two
columns of Table 5. There is a clear and signicant motive to locate vertically linked subsidiaries
in countries with close trade relationships.
7.2 Endogeneity of network variables
In this sub-section, we address the potential endogeneity that can arise with the network vari-
ables. So far we have used lagged location variables, i.e., dt 1 and ut 1, to construct measures
of existing production networks. While the time lag between these variables and the dependent
variables, i.e., dt and ut, and the control of rm xed e¤ect helps establish the causal e¤ect,
the former can still be endogenous because of the serial autocorrelation in the residuals, t. To
address this issue, we adopt a two-stage instrumental variable approach. In this approach, we
use W  Xt 1, where W represents W dd;t 1, W ud;t 1, Wmd;t 1 or W du;t 1 and Xt 1 is a matrix of
lagged host-country attributes, as potential instruments for the network variables.
20We also considered pre-2005 trade data and found largely similar results.
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Formally, we estimate:
downstream : Pr [dt = 1] = Xt 1d (20)
+dd  \W dd;t 1dt 1 + ud  \W ud;t 1ut 1 + md  \lnMt 1 + d;t
uptream : Pr [ut = 1] = Xt 1u + 
d
u  \W du;t 1dt 1 + u;t; (21)
where
\W dd;t 1dt 1 = E
h
W dd;t 1dt 1jW dd;t 1Xt 1
i
\W ud;t 1ut 1 = E

W ud;t 1ut 1jW ud;t 1Xt 1

(22)
\lnMt 1 = E[lnMt 1j lnWmd;t 1Xt 1]
\W du;t 1dt 1 = E
h
W du;t 1ut 1jW du;t 1Xt 1
i
:
The results are reported in Table 6. We nd that most parameters remain qualitatively
similar after we correct for the potential endogeneity of network variables with the exception of
export market potential. We continue to observe signicant horizontal and vertical interde-
pendence across multinationalsforeign production locations.
[Table 6 about here]
8 Conclusion
This study is one of the rst attempts to estimate the interdependence in multinationalsglobal
production network. Using a detailed French multinational subsidiary dataset, the paper nds,
for the rst time, strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interaction between MNCsforeign
production locations. These results complement existing contributions where evidence of in-
terdependence, obtained with aggregate FDI data, has been ambiguous. Here we show that
third-country subsidiaries exert a signicant e¤ect on French multinationalsentry decision, in
both downstream and upstream productions. But the e¤ect varies considerably with the linkage
of subsidiaries. Multinationals are more likely to expand horizontally when the trade cost of
importing nal products from existing downstream subsidiaries is relatively high. But they
tend to locate vertically linked subsidiaries in countries with low intra-rm trade costs, espe-
cially when there is a strong input-output relationship. These results are robust to the choice
of weighting matrices used in the econometric model and the control of potential endogeneity
in the network variables.
Strikingly there is little evidence of horizontal interdependence between multinationalspro-
duction at home and new investment abroad once we take into account the third-country net-
work e¤ects. This constitutes sharp contrast to the literature where primary emphasis has been
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placed on the horizontal linkage between home- and host-country production. This departure
can be explained by the assumption made in most previous studies that views a rms decision
to invest in a foreign country as independent of its locations in third nations, even though the
majority of multinationals today operate a multilateral production network.
This paper conveys important policy implications for both FDI home and host countries: It is
crucial to analyze the causes and e¤ects of FDI in the context of global production network. As
shown in the paper, assuming away the interdependence between foreign production locations
is likely to over-estimate the substituting relationship between home-country production and
foreign investment. It would also fail to account for the spillovers between FDI ows, including,
for example, the e¤ect of FDI inows to third countries on a host countrys ability to attract
multinational rms.
While our paper takes the step to examine the interdependence in multinational production
network, more research is needed in this area. For example, future work can be undertaken
to investigate the heterogeneity of multinationals production networks and the role of rm
characteristics such as productivity and knowledge capital intensity in explaining the network
attributes. This type of analysis will provide us additional insights on the global organization
of rms.
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Table 1: Estimating entry decision without network factors
Dependent variable: H0 downstream (dt) upstream (ut)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
host-country GDP + 0.008*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
host-country product tari¤ + 0.005*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EU membership +/ -0.03*** -0.01***
(0.001) (0.001)
distance to home +/ -0.03*** -0.01***
(0.001) (0.001)
real unit labor cost  -0.03*** -0.02***
(0.002) (0.001)
home-country product tari¤  -0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
corporate tax  0.009*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
entry cost  -0.006*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
rm xed e¤ect yes yes yes yes
country xed e¤ect no yes no yes
No. of observations 102,162 158,952 102,162 158,952
R square 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.18
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in natural logs;
(ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at rm level; (iii) ***,
** and * represent signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2: Estimating downstream entry decision with network factors
Dependent variable: H0 downstream (dt)
entry (1) (2) (3)
horizontal interdependence
W dd;t 1dt 1 (dist. weighted) + 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
W dd;t 1dt 1 (tari¤ weighted) + 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
vertical interdependence
W ud;t 1ut 1 (dist. weighted)  -0.14* -0.19*
(0.08) (0.07)
W ud;t 1ut 1 (tari¤ weighted)  -0.06 -0.01
(0.07) (0.05)
market potential
W dd;t 1(1  dt 1) (dist.) + 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
W dd;t 1(1  dt 1) (tari¤) + 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
host-country GDP + 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.005) (0.005)
host-country product tari¤ + 0.001 0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
EU membership +/ -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.001) (0.001)
distance to home +/ -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.001) (0.001)
real unit labor cost  -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.002) (0.002)
home-country product tari¤  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
corporate tax  0.02*** 0.02***
(0.001) (0.001)
entry cost  -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000)
rm xed e¤ect yes yes yes
country xed e¤ect no no yes
No. of observations 102,162 102,162 158,952
R square 0.09 0.09 0.27
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in
natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and
clustered at rm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent signicance at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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Table 3: Estimating downstream entry decision with network factors: the extent of vertical
linkage
Dependent variable: H0 downstream (dt)
entry (1) (2)
horizontal interdependence
W dd;t 1dt 1 (dist. weighted) + 0.01*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000)
W dd;t 1dt 1 (tari¤ weighted) + 0.001*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
vertical interdependence
W ud;t 1ut 1 (dist. and IO-coef. weighted)  -3.06*** -3.15***
(1.38) (1.01)
W ud;t 1ut 1 (tari¤ and IO-coef. weighted)  -1.55*** 0.05
(0.61) (0.42)
market potential
W dd;t 1(1  dt 1) (dist.) + 0.58*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.03)
W dd;t 1(1  dt 1) (tari¤) + 0.02*** 0.008*
(0.000) (0.004)
host-country GDP + 0.02***
(0.005)
host-country product tari¤ + 0.002 -0.002***
(0.002) (0.000)
EU membership +/ -0.02***
(0.001)
distance to home +/ -0.06***
(0.001)
real unit labor cost  -0.04***
(0.002)
home-country product tari¤  -0.006*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
corporate tax  0.02***
(0.001)
entry cost  -0.008***
(0.000)
rm xed e¤ect yes yes
country xed e¤ect no yes
No. of observations 102,162 158,952
R square 0.09 0.27
Prob>F 0.00 0.00
Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in
natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and
clustered at rm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent signicance at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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Table 4: Estimating upstream entry decision with network factors
Dependent variable: H0 upstream (ut)
entry (1) (2)
vertical interdependence
W du;t 1dt 1 (dist. weighted) + 6.60*** 2.31***
(1.29) (0.80)
W du;t 1dt 1 (dist. and size weighted)  -0.28*** -0.10***
(0.05) (0.03)
host-country GDP + 0.003***
(0.001)
host-country product tari¤ + 0.03*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
EU membership +/ -0.01***
(0.001)
distance to home +/ -0.01***
(0.001)
real unit labor cost  -0.02**
(0.001)
home-country product tari¤  0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
corporate tax  0.005***
(0.001)
entry cost 
rm xed e¤ect yes yes
country xed e¤ect no yes
No. of observations 102,162 158,952
R square 0.04 0.18
Prob>F 0.00 0.00
Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured
in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and
clustered at rm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent signicance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5: Estimating downstream and upstream entry decision with network factors: trade ow
weighted
Dependent variable: H0 downstream (dt) upstream (ut)
entry (1) (2) (1) (2)
horizontal interdependence
W dd;t 1dt 1 (imports weighted)  -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
vertical interdependence
W ud;t 1ut 1 (imports weighted) + 0.001*** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
market potential
W dd;t 1(1  dt 1) (exports weighted) + 0.006*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
horizontal interdependence
W du;t 1dt 1 (exports weighted) + 0.11*** 0.06***
(0.03) (0.01)
host-country GDP + 0.01*** 0.002***
(0.005) (0.001)
host-country product tari¤ + 0.004 -0.001 0.003*** 0.001***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EU membership +/ -0.03*** -0.01***
(0.001) (0.001)
distance to home +/ -0.03*** -0.01***
(0.001) (0.001)
real unit labor cost  -0.03*** -0.02***
(0.002) (0.001)
home-country product tari¤  -0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
corporate tax  0.007*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
entry cost  -0.007*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
rm xed e¤ect yes yes yes yes
country xed e¤ect no yes no yes
No. of observations 102,162 158,952 102,162 158,952
R square 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.19
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured in natural logs; (ii)
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at rm level; (iii) ***, ** and *
represent signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 6: Estimating downstream and upstream entry decision with network factors: two-stage
IV (second stage)
Dependent variable: entry H0 downstream upstream
(dt) (ut)
horizontal interdependence
W dd;t 1dt 1 (imports weighted)  -0.06***
(0.02)
vertical interdependence
W ud;t 1ut 1 (imports weighted) + 0.003***
(0.000)
market potential
W dd;t 1(1  dt 1) (exports weighted) + 0.000
(0.000)
vertical interdependence
W du;t 1dt 1 (exports weighted) + 0.10*
(0.06)
host-country product tari¤ + -0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
home-country product tari¤  -0.001* 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
rm xed e¤ect yes yes
country xed e¤ect yes yes
No. of observations 158,952 158,952
R square 0.27 0.19
Prob>F 0.00 0.00
Note: (i) All explanatory variables except EU membership are measured
in natural logs; (ii) Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and
clustered at rm level; (iii) ***, ** and * represent signicance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Figure 1: Renaults global production network (the darker and lighter areas represent upstream
and downstream production locations, respectively)
Figure 2: Essilors global production network (the darker and lighter areas represent upstream
and downstream production locations, respectively)
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Figure 3: The distribution of French MNCs by the number of invested countries
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Figure 4: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by the distance between subsidiaries
(kernel density estimates are represented by the curve)
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Figure 5: The kernel density of between-subsidiary distance: downstream subsidiaries v.s. ver-
tically linked subsidiaries
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Figure 6: The distribution of French MNC subsidiaries by the tari¤ rate between subsidiaries
(kernel density estimates are represented by the curve)
32
0
2
4
6
8
de
ns
ity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
tariff
downstream subsidiaries vertically linked subsidiaries
Figure 7: The kernel density of between-subsidiary tari¤: downstream subsidiaries v.s. vertically
linked subsidiaries
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